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ABSTRACT
BOGARDUS, JUSTIN Economic and Political Implications of Agricultural Subsidies
and Farm Policy, June 2014.
ADVISORS: Bradley Lewis (Economics) and Clifford Brown (Political Science)
This thesis pertains to agricultural subsidies, their economic and political
implications and what would happen to both price and production levels of different
crops should those subsidies be removed. The 3 main crops examined are corn, wool and
soybeans. Technological advancements made after 1900 had a profound effect on
productivity and efficiency, leading to a number of important economic effects. Market
integration, economies of scale, market structure, vertical integration and subsidization,
all led to government intervention in the form of regulation and subsidy.
Farm policy, starting in early 1900s, focused on price stabilization policies and
food programs through the different federal acts and agencies created over this time
period, starting with the USDA and New Deal in the early 1900s to the post WWII farm
bills, culminating with the recent farm bills in Congress now. The empirical analysis is
based on data obtained through the USDA regarding production, import, export, price
and subsidy data. The analytic focus of the econometric model is on the potential effects
of eliminating subsidies, hypothesizing that production would be lower, prices higher and
the level of disparity between farm and non-farm incomes, higher. I found the conclusion
mixed, with the hypothesis being supported for some, but not all cases.
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Chapter 1
Mechanical and Scientific Advancements and Their Effects
Beginning in the early 1900s, there have been several technological advancements
that have impacted the farming process, both for producers and for consumers. There are
four distinct areas of advancement that instituted dynamic change in not only costs but
also efficiency and output levels. These three areas include technological advancements,
biotechnological advancements and expansion of information and marketing. Between
them, the result was the mechanization and industrialization of the farming industry, with
effects including an increase in farm size, an increase in output, a decrease in price and a
decrease in labor. There are both positive and negative externalities related to these
effects that shaped the agricultural sector into what it is today.
Technological Advancements
There have been a multitude of technological advancements since the turn of the
century that have had a great impact on efficiency and cost. Arguably the most important
of them was the change from horsepower to the gasoline tractor. This change not only
influenced the amount produced, but also which crops were grown to begin with. In
addition to the switch to the tractor, the electrification of rural areas and the development
of interstate travel were two more major advancements that expanded on these increases.
Horsepower was the backbone of farm power since the beginning of American
agriculture. By 1915 it had reached its peak with over 21 million horses in use. (Gardner,
pp. 10-11) At the same time however, the gasoline tractor was being developed and
improved. By the 1930s the tractor had reached a new level of versatility, reliability and
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affordability and began to replace the traditional form of power.2 The economic result
was a dramatic increase in output per hour.3
Pertaining to the production aspect of farming, the usage of horses contained a
major drawback, namely that the horses needed to be fed. The main food source for
horses was oats, meaning that farmers needed to set aside a certain amount of their
farmable land to grow the feed. The economic implications are essentially that the area
set aside is a deadweight loss, meaning that it is lost revenue. With the switch to the
tractor, there was no more need to grow the oats for feed, leading to a major shift in
which crops were grown in the United States. The initial figures indicate that over 93
million acres were used to grow oats, and by the 1960s this dropped to only 4 million
acres.4 By switching to the gasoline tractor, farmers had essentially freed up over 25% of
America’s farmable land area.
In addition to the adoption of the tractor, there have been a myriad of other
technological innovations in the period between 1900 and 1940. These include the
introduction of completely new types of machinery as well as durability improvements of
existing inputs. Table 2.1 below lists some of the notable technical innovations during
the time period.5 The effects of these amazing changes were a sharp increase in output
given the current inputs and both qualitative and quantitative changes in both crops and
livestock.

2

Ibid.
American Agriculture pages 14-15
4
American Agriculture page 12
5
American Agriculture page 9
3
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The second major area of dynamic change was the electrification of rural areas,
which led to not only the advancement of rural areas with respect to urban areas but also
to a new level of mechanization of smaller farms. The major electrification effort began
with the New Deal under President Roosevelt. Under it, the Rural Electrification
Administration was established in 1935 and tasked with wiring rural areas, notably major
farm areas, with electricity. In 1982 a report was submitted to the House Appropriations
Committee regarding the accomplishments of the REA program. The resulting report
highlighted the success of the program, with the graph below showing that “By 1953
more than 90 percent of all farms in the U.S. had electricity; for telephone service, the 90
percent mark was passed in 1976”. With this electrification, communication in the form
of telephone lines also increased, generating a much greater flow of information in and
out of rural areas.
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The third and final major area of technological advancement came later on in the
1950s with the development of the Interstate highway system. Prior to the inception of
the highway system, train delivery was the standard. The process was expensive, slow
and given the time sensitive nature of crops almost wholly unfeasible, in effect leaving
farming much more localized. However, after President Eisenhower signed the Interstate
Highways Act into law in 1956, cross-country travel was much easier, linking the
different regions within the country. As Andrew Armbruster wrote in his paper The
Interstate Highway System, “Movement of freight via trucks using the interstate highway
system is markedly less expensive than movement by rail.” (Armbruster, 2005) The
graph below shows that highway freight costs are ¼ as much as railway costs, which
holds true for the agricultural sector as well.
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The effects of these technological advancements can be described as the
“mechanization of the farm”. With the introduction of new machinery, much of the more
painstaking labor was alleviated, and both the cost and amount of labor provided went
down during the 1930-1960 period. Figure 2.3a shows the amount of labor hours needed
for several major crops over the 1900-1990 period, and it confirms the downward trend.8

8

American Agriculture page 16
8

Following WWII, which in itself drew a lot of labor away from the farming sector, labor
was pushed out further with more technological substitutes. In terms of production, the
adoption of the tractor over the horse led to major efficiency and output level related
gains, and also changed land allocation protocols.9 Later on with biotechnological
changes, these gains would see further increases. Finally, with the electrification of rural
America, the development of new machinery and their subsequent availability in rural
areas led to the steep divide between rural and urban areas mellowing.
9

American Agriculture pages 18-19
9

Chemical and Biotechnological Advancements
The second major area of farming advancement was in the biotech field. The
advent of pesticides, fertilizers and genetic engineering rivals the importance of the
tractor in the evolution of American agriculture. Later on the in the 1960s biotech would
make another great leap forward with the introduction of animal antibiotics and
hormones. Through these character improvements output and land availability grew even
further.
The first improvements came in the form of pesticides and fertilization. During
the post WWII period, commercial fertilization took off, particularly the use of nitrogen
based fertilizer.10 Figures 2.6a and 2.6b show the growth trend in the use of fertilizer
over time, with a major uptick starting in 1940, right around the end of WWII. 11

10
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American Agriculture pages 22-26
American Agriculture page 23
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Nitrogen is extremely important to the growth of plants and coupled with seed
advancements that allowed for the uptake of more nutrients, the growth rate of crops
increased.
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The second major group of chemicals used in farming is pesticides. Figure 2.7
shows a similar trend to that of fertilizers, with usage following WWII massively
increasing.12

The economic gains from pesticides are very real, around $3 to $5 dollars for every $1 of
pesticides used.13 Not every outcome is positive however, and pesticide use has garnered
heavy media attention surrounding the pesticide chemicals and their potential harm to
both the environment and to the population who consume the crops. Over time the more

12
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American Agriculture page 24
Ibid.
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harmful chemicals such as DDT and others that have long-term environmental effects
have been phased out.14
Genetic engineering of crops for pest control and desirable traits has been one of
the most significant achievements for not only the farming sector in the United States but
also the world. While selective breeding has been around for hundreds if not thousands
of years, the scientific achievement of targeted genetic engineering has made it possible
to grow stronger, more resilient crops. And while there are arguments against genetically
modified organisms (GMOs), the overall consensus is one of major success.
The advent of GMOs has been a boon for both supply and output of major crops.
The breeding of traits for resiliency to pests and varying weather conditions have allowed
for much less crop loss to weeds, destructive insects and extreme weather.15 Another
great economic and environmental benefit is that the cost of genetically modified seeds is
“…more than offset by the savings from the reduction in the use of pesticides”.16
According to the American Institute of Biological Sciences paper Benefits and Risks of
Genetic Engineering in Agriculture, “Engineering crop resistance to insect and plant
pathogen pests offers opportunities to reduce the use of insecticides and fungicides in
crop production. This approach can be expected to reduce problems from pesticides and
improve the economics of pest control.”17 The result is that over half of soybean acreage
and one fourth of corn acreage contained genetically modified seeds by the year 2000.
The final major advancement in farming due to biotech and other scientific
advancements is the introduction of antibiotics and hormones to livestock. Antibiotics
14

American Agriculture page 25
American Agriculture page 26
16
Ibid.
17
D. Pimentel, 1989
15
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have been routinely given to cattle and other animals since 1960, but it really took off in
the 1980s when scientists could mass-produce synthetic hormones and specifically
engineer antibiotics.18 These hormones allow for animals to grow at a much faster rate
and to also grow to a much bigger size.
The pushback against GMOs and animal hormones has been focused primarily on
scientific ambiguity. One example is the argument that there is no way to be sure of the
long-term health effects of GMOs or the hormones in animals. This argument has been
mostly discarded; as we are now well into the future since the adoption of modified seeds
and the introduction of hormones. The major argument against is now focused primarily
on biodiversity and more importantly the lack thereof. The Biological Sciences paper
states, “The Traditional plant breeding techniques have dramatically reduced genetic
diversity in most crops. Unfortunately, this genetic uniformity has increased crop
vulnerability to insect pests, diseases, and climatic fluctuations (NAS 1972)”.19
Previously, crop fields contained many different species of the same crop in the
effort to diversify in case of pests or weather anomalies. With selective breeding
essentially discontinuing many species of seeds in favor of a handful that are genetically
superior, the threat then is whether or not a “superbug” can effectively kill off the entire
crop. This question is also poised with respect to antibiotics in livestock and whether or
not we are breeding an antibiotic resistant superbug that will be detrimental to humans.
These questions must be addressed moving forward in order to ensure the safety of both
the food supply and of consumers.
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The effects of the biotech and other scientific advancements are very similar to
the technological ones. With better, faster growing livestock and crops, costs decrease
and the supply of these products increase, which at the same time lowers prices. Genetic
advantages also allow for increased land usage into areas that before might have been
impossible. In the benefits section of their genetic engineering paper, Pimental and the
other authors argue the same points in saying, “Genetic engineering could significantly
improve yields and enhance the efficiency of crop and livestock production in the coming
decades (NAS 1987b). These goals can be accomplished by increasing the proportion of a
crop that can be harvested and by enhancing a crop's tolerance to various stresses”.20
On the more critical side, the introduction of genetic engineering begs the
question of product rights and ethics. The US is currently seeing this with Monsanto and
the question of whether or not one can “patent life”. Pimental and his co-authors address
these issue of ethics and economic incentives, “The financial rewards for successful
research in genetic engineering are enormous. However, these incentives are unlikely to
encourage innovation aimed at providing the greatest humanitarian good (Buttel et al.
1985)”.21 Their conclusion given these ethical concerns is to have a clearly defined
government role in regulating the process while at the same time promoting research.
Information and Marketing
The improvement of communications technology during the 20th century had a
profound effect on the dissemination of information in real time, something more than
advantageous for farmers. Through the radio, telephone, television, and later on through
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the Internet, farmers had access to new information that ultimately led to better crop
yields and to better marketing and selling of their products.
Through the electrification of rural areas, farmers gained access to means of
communication that dwarfed their current system. The radio and television were the first
of these advancements, and brought not only economic but also social and cultural
improvement as well.22 With the introduction of the radio and television to rural
communities and to farmers, real time information of weather and markets gave a huge
leg up to rural farmers. In the cultural and social aspect, the radio also brought
educational programming and entertainment, which helped to close even further the gap
between urban and rural populations.23 The second major advancement during the first
half of the 20th century was the telephone. In addition to the advantages gained above in
real time transfer of information, the telephone went further in that it also allowed for
farmers to conduct business transactions at an unprecedented speed.24
The last major communications improvement came much later around the 1980s
with the invention of the Internet. With the Internet and related technologies information
gathering went from fast to instantaneous, and meteorological science became
significantly more accurate, giving farmers much more reliable a picture of what was
going to happen. Combined with GPS satellites, planting and harvesting became much
more accurate and to a point automated as tractors with GPS systems could essentially
plow the fields without the need for a driver. With respect to marketing, the Internet gave

22
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farmers and other businesses a much bigger customer base, as well as a much more
precise measure of different markets not only locally but also nationwide.
There were significant gains made through the use and spread of communications
technology into rural America. From 1925 to 1954 radio use increased from 4% to
almost universal use, and television use was at almost 35%. With an addendum to the
Rural Electrification Act in 1949 to include a subsidization program for telephone
installation, telephone ownership rose to 76% by 1964. 25
Overall Effects
Looking at the different technological and scientific advancements together, an
overall picture of progress can be seen between the turn of the 20th century until the
present. The economic impacts can be seen in three major areas: production, costs and
price. All three show positive change, with production levels up and costs and prices
down. On a related note, farm labor has also been affected, and there are both pros and
cons to the resulting figures.
The large majority of advancements have been focused on the supply side of the
farming equation. Scientific achievements have allowed for great growth in land
productivity, namely the total amount of land available and how much can be extracted
from it. Coupled with efficiency increases in related technologies including the tractor
and processing equipment, the amount of crops harvested and the speed in which they are
processed has increased steadily, leading to a tremendous increase in supply.
Additionally, scientific advancements allowed for a much stronger crop, leading to an
expansion in land area used, further boosting production levels.

25

Ibid.
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With these advancements came not only production increases, but also cost
decreases. With the genetic engineering of crops, more generic growth aids such as
fertilizer and pesticides became less and less necessary. The outdating of these
chemicals, as well as the efficiency gains in the production process led to major decreases
in production costs. The end result was a sharp decline in both food prices and the
amount of money households had to spend on food. From the beginning to the end of the
1900s, food prices went down 35% and the percentage of disposable income spent on
food also declined 29%.26 While a decline in food prices is beneficial to consumers, the
impact of such a decline much harsher for farmers. A decrease in price leads to a direct
decrease in farm income.
One of the biggest effects of these advancements is the expansion of big farms.
For big farms, the technological improvements were as much if not more important than
for small farms. Tractor tech. and other commercial machinery allowed for the
minimizing of costs. Secondly, communications tech. is more beneficial for large
companies as the cost benefit ratio is better than with small companies, if small
companies can even afford to advertise. The gains can be seen as the average acreage per
farm increased from 55 acres in 1929 to 220 acres in 1997.27 This highlights the
increasing amount of land concentration. Large farms also benefit from economies of
scale. What this means is that as farms grow, their cost per unit actually decreases,
leading to much higher profits.
A second motivation in the shift to big farming is vertical integration. Vertical
integration is the linking of different levels of the supply chain through a common owner.
26
27

American Agriculture page 141
American Agriculture pages 66-67
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For agriculture, this is seen through company involvement with the production, transport
and sale of crops and livestock. Through this integration, the cost of doing business is
consolidated, benefiting consumers as prices can go down in response to lower input
costs. However, this is not always the case as vertically integrated companies often have
tremendous market power, leading to the monopolization of markets.
In conclusion there have been several technological advancements that have
impacted the farming process, both for producers and for consumers. The technological
advancements, biotechnological advancements and expansion of information and
marketing have led to the mechanization and industrialization of the farming industry,
effectively increasing farm size, increasing output, decreasing price and decreasing labor.
There are both positive and negative externalities related to these effects that shaped both
political and economic policy related to the agricultural sector.
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Chapter 2
Economic Theory and Political History
There are four major areas of economic theory that affect the agricultural market:
vertical integration, economies of scale, elasticity of markets and subsidization. These
theories affect the agricultural sector in a myriad of ways, some positive and some
negative. Through the processes of integration and expansion of scale and combined
with the elasticity and variability of the market, government subsidization in the form of
price controls and income supports has been the answer.
From the post WWII period onward, legislation has evolved and the way in which
the government tackles the question of subsidies has also evolved. From the New Deal in
the 1930s to the Farm Bills in the 60s and 70s to the FAIR Act and ARPA in the 90s the
method by which the government has supported the farmer has changed. Along with it,
the involvement of interest groups has shifted and consolidated power. The landscape
today has shown there to be a tight relationship between government and business,
leading to precarious positions for those in government who do not wish to jeopardize
their futures in the private sector. These economic and political factors have all led up to
the landscape of the agricultural sector today, and understanding the past evolutions is the
key to moving forward with solutions.
Economic Theory
The first area of economic theory is vertical integration otherwise known as
supply chain integration. In theory, vertical integration is the consolidation of different
levels in the supply chain by one company. For example, a company owning both the
production of a product and the methods of shipping can be said to own two levels within
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the supply chain. In the late 1800s, this vertical integration took the form of companies
owning the major mode of transportation, railroads. Because of the manipulation of
prices and abuses by these companies, the first form of anti-trust legislation came in to
protect the consumers.
In practice, there are two major forms of this integration in the agricultural sector:
contract integration and ownership integration. Contract integration is basically the
commitment of farmers to sell to one company and ownership integration is similar to the
theory above, a company owning two or more levels within the system.28 The most
important aspect of vertical integration within the agricultural sector is that there is an
exemption from existing antitrust law, leading to monopoly abuses including food price
increases.29
The economic impacts of vertical integration within the agricultural sector are
similar to many other areas in which there are abuses. Through the consolidation of the
supply chain, farms have become bigger and more powerful and it has resulted in more
control over both crop prices as well as intermediate input prices. In the area of
intermediary inputs, much of the mechanical equipment is manufactured through a
handful of companies, leading to increases in the prices of their machines as well. These
costs are passed along to the consumer, who suffers the most.
The second area of economic theory is what is known as economies of scale. An
economy of scale is the theory that as a company gets bigger their costs decrease, giving
them an advantage within the market. This directly relates to the incidence of abuses and

28
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Ronald D. Knutson, 1990 pages 243-44
Ronald D. Knutson, 1990 page 285
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vertical integration above, as a sector with tremendous economies of scale will have a
much easier time integrating and growing.
There are two main forms of the economics of farm size, technical economics and
pecuniary economics. The first implies that the increase in size causes a reduction in the
average cost of production, coming with it huge market power. Pecuniary economics
cites the advantage being that as a company grows their cost of inputs goes down.30
Figure 8.2 below showcases the effects of technical economics, with the short run
average cost curves (SAC) decreasing as farm size increases, eventually reaching a
minimum efficient size. Looking to the long-term effects we see again the cost per unit
of output decreasing toward the point C3.

While these economies of scale are terrific for producers, considerations need to be taken
with respect to consumer implications and impacts. Given the reductions in costs and
30

Ronald D. Knutson, 1990 pages 177-180
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increase in technological progress, the consumers seem to benefit in both the short and
long run through the reduction of prices. The graph below shows the economic theory
behind the supply curve shift, indicating that through the marginal and average cost shifts
downward prices will indeed drop.31 However, there is also the implication that the
producers wont pass these savings along to the consumer in a less than competitive
market, but rather reap more profits for themselves. In practice, this seems to be more
the case in the real world.

Within the agricultural sector there are two main reasons for the scalability of
farms: technological changes, marketing and market equilibrium. Technological
changes, which were covered in chapter one, equal major cost minimization. Much of
the machinery used in farming is expensive, and bigger companies have a much easier
time affording and implementing these tools. Secondly, marketing costs are also much
31

Ronald D. Knutson, 1990 Figure 8.4 page 181
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lighter as the company gets bigger. The costs for marketing in a certain area are the same
for both big and small companies, which means that the bigger companies have less real
cost in comparison.32
The elasticity of demand for crops within the agricultural market plays an
important role in the determination of whether or not the government should grant
subsidies and directly intervene in the market. In economics, elasticity indicates how
much of one good will be sold when another variable is changed. This can be on the
supply side or demand side. For the supply side the question would be how much more
will I produce and the demand side would be how much more will be demanded. Within
these parameters, price elasticity of demand is almost always negative, meaning as the
price of the good goes up; the demand for it will go down.
Within the agricultural sector, this negative price elasticity can be seen. The
elasticity of demand for crops according to Gardner in American Agriculture in the 20th
Century is -.2, meaning that for every unit of price increase the demand for the good will
go down by .2 units.33 Within the market itself, the price of these crops is also very
sensitive. Given the volatile nature of farming, with weather anomalies and crop failures,
prices shift dramatically. These price swings, coupled with the inelastic nature of the
market leads to demand inconsistencies.
The picture painted by these three economic effects is not economically or
politically ideal. The market is unpredictable, big corporate farms are pushing out the
small farmers, consumers are being subjected to artificially higher prices and there is no
private sector insurance for farmers in case of crop disaster. These negative externalities
32
33

Gardner American Agriculture page 73
Gardner American Agriculture page 141
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beg for resolution, and the answers dating all the way back to the New Deal era and used
still today is subsidies.
History and Evolution of Subsidies and Legislation
Subsidization as an economic theory is the support of a sector within the economy
with the goal of promoting certain outcomes. In the case of the agricultural sector these
outcomes are to support and stabilize crop prices and to ensure farmers a basic level of
income. In conjunction with these two main goals there are also secondary goals in the
form of food programs aimed at helping impoverished citizens. Over the course of the
20th century there have been a myriad of ways to go about solving these two dilemmas,
but many have been phased out or evolved into the main forms we see today.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 signaled the first step in the
government’s involvement within the agricultural sector, mainly through a quota system
that limited production. The main goal of this act was to in effect create what is known
as “parity” prices. Limiting production artificially moved the crop prices towards a
standard value. For example if in 1920 a bushel of wheat could purchase 2 dollars worth
of goods then in 1933 that same bushel should be worth the same amount. In economic
effect, it creates a price floor, a direct response to the plummeting prices during the Great
Depression.34 Following in the New Deal was a set of 7 different subsidization policies,
many which are still alive in some form today. These 7 are:
1. Price supports
2. Subsidized distribution
3. Export subsidies

34

Pasour, 2005 page 87
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4. Farm credits
5. Land conservation
6. Crop insurance
7. Expansion in research35
This increased involvement dwindled with the start of WWII and did not truly come back
into effect until the 1950s with the reintroduction of the post WWII Farm Bills. These
farm bills were reauthorized every 5 or so years, and come into form with many different
titles. Between 1965 and 2008 there were 10 farm bills, with the 2014 bill marking the
eleventh. 36 The ten bills are:
1. Food and Agricultural Act of 1965
2. Agricultural Act of 1970
3. Agricultural and Consumer Protection Act of 1973
4. Food and Agriculture Act of 1977
5. Agriculture and Food Act of 1981
6. Food Security Act of 1985
7. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990
8. Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996
9. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002
10. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008
Each of these bills contain its own prominent feature, with some bills amending preexisting legislation and others passing more progressive legislation. Coupled with other

35
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agriculture related policy in the 1940s and 50s, the shift from more supply oriented
policies to producer and consumer oriented policies can be seen. The first farm bill, the
Food and Agricultural Act of 1965 is important in that it repealed one of the more cost
inefficient policies known as the Soil Bank.37 Though the model was used again in a
subsequent conservation program in the 1980s, the retirement of acreage was seen as a
more obsolete and wasteful use of arable land.
The Agricultural Act of 1970 furthered this progressive legislative trend by easing
restrictions including quotas, allotments and planting restrictions. In addition to this shift
in commodity support policy, a new maximum payment amount was set at $55,000
dollars per crop.38 Moving to the Act of 1973, the 4-year bill marked the first incidence
of target pricing and deficiency payments, two of the major policies still in use today. It
did reduce payments from the 1970 bill down to $20,000 dollars, but compensated by
enacting disaster payments as well as disaster reserves, and also amended the Food Stamp
Act.39 The last farm bill of the 1970s came later in 1977, and increased price and income
supports for grain crops, simplified further the eligibility requirements for the Food
Stamp Program, and made the USDA the leading agency for agricultural research.40
The last 3 farm bills before the major FAIR Act reforms in 1996 were the Agriculture
and Food Act of 1981, Food Security Act of 1985, and the Food, Agriculture,
Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990. In 1981 the commodity programs were continued
through 1985, and target prices were set grains, cotton, rice and wheat, but were
subsequently frozen in 1984. In 1990 several new agencies and programs were created
37
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related to forest land stewardship and community forestry. Additionally, safety standards
in the handling of eggs and other products were increased in an effort to combat foodborne illness.41
The 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act marked the most
significant change in governmental policy with the shift from direct government
involvement to much more market oriented policies. Over time, several methods were
phased out in favor of more cost effective, targeted programs. Major governmental
supply controls were halted, including the idling of acreage, reduction of supply and
grain storage in favor of more direct payments.42 Figure 7.1 below shows the change in
governmental acreage idling over time up until 1994, around the time of the passage of
the FAIR Act, which marked the major shift towards market oriented policies. As the
graph shows, between 1934-1954 there was no idling due to World War 2. It picked up
again following the war and continued into the 1970s. The major decline during the
1970s was due to the Soviet scare and subsequent grain shortages. After that recovery it
rose, but immediately began to decline over the 1984-1994 period, confirming the shift

41
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away from this costly, inefficient policy.

The three major channels through which the subsidies now flowed were price
supports tied to production, income supports not tied and disaster payments.43 The
mechanisms in which the funds were transferred were through direct payments, market
loss assistance and loan deficiency payments. Figure 1.2 below shows the trend of the
three major payment types from 1990 through 2008. As expected, direct payments and
market loss payments did not begin until the FAIR Act took effect, and while price
supports were used, their usage declined in the years prior to the FAIR Act, but increased

43
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with the other two around the same time.

A second major recent policy shift came in 2000 with the Agriculture Risk
Protection Act. This piece of legislation focused on the third facet, disaster payments, in
the form of crop insurance. In addition to the price stabilization and income protection
policies set forth by the government, crop insurance is the third major area of government
intervention. Private insurance is often not available within the agricultural sector due
what is known as uninsurable risk, meaning that it is often not profitable for insurance
companies to insure farmland and crops. In response to this, the government became to
provider of most of the insurance policies.44
With the restructuring of the governmental crop insurance program in 2000,
higher insurance coverage became much more affordable to farmers, with approximately
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$7 billion dollars outlayed by the CBO for the foreseeable future. Additionally, the
program has shown itself to be very successful, with 80% of the eligible acres covered
under the program.45 Figure 3.1 below shows an interesting piece of information related
to the crop insurance dilemma. Prior to the easing of restrictions and costs to farmers, the
coverage levels seen below were not attainable affordably. With the passage of ARPA,
coverage levels increased and farmers were able to take advantage of higher levels of
protection. Interestingly, the 70% coverage levels has the most acres covered under it,
signifying that farmers are more than content with 70% coverage, and aren’t necessarily
holding out for complete coverage.
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The crop insurance program grew dramatically over the 2000-2010 period, but it has not
been all good news. The taxpayer costs grew along with the size of the program, and by
2010 the costs were large enough to merit steps to rein them in.46
Interest Groups and Agribusinesses
The last major area of influence in both the economic and political aspect of
agricultural subsidies is the private sector and more narrowly business involvement.
Interest groups lobby Congress for bills that will directly impact them and shape the
economic argument in their favor, and businesses comingle with the government in ways
that can and do cause negative externalities.
There are two main branches of interest groups, first the producer lobby and
second agribusinesses. Under these large umbrellas are different sub groups with a wide
range of numbers and issues. Within the bulk of these groups there are both conservative
and liberal organizations that sometimes butt heads on legislation. In the area of
agricultural policy it is often the case that when one group benefits from a bill another
loses out in some capacity. Over time specific groups have amassed a large amount of
political clout and the landscape today highlights the winners.
The first interest group sector is the producer lobby. The strength of the lobby
lies in the amount of farmers represented and their relative importance in the state they
are in. Consequently, as their numbers decline their power and influence also declines.
Within the producer lobby there are three main groups, the general farm organizations,
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commodity groups and cooperatives. Each specific group focuses on a different aspect of
the production side of the farm equation.47
The first group, the general farm organization is the widest ranging of the three
groups, encompassing farmers in many different areas, not limited to food or commodity
crops. In this area there are two main organizations, the American Farm Bureau
Federation and the National Farmers Union. On the conservative side is the American
Farm Bureau, which in this case advocate for more of a free market, minimal government
approach. The National Farmers Union on the other hand is more liberal, and its
members are staunch supporters of price and income supports as well as major
governmental involvement in price setting and crop insurance.48
Moving to the second group, the commodity group, the focus is much narrower.
These commodity groups focus on a specific product or crop, and include not only the
farmers and their crops but also the input producers, including the machinery makers and
transportation companies. Consequently, the relative strength of certain commodity
lobbies rise and fall with their relative importance in the American agricultural sector.
As it stands now, two of the most important organizations are the National Association of
Wheat Growers and Corn growers, as they occupy a large portion of the land used.49
The final sector within the producer lobby is the cooperative. These cooperatives
harken back to the original cooperatives of farmers joining together to enhance their
ability to market and sell their goods. With respect to the lobbying aspect, these
cooperatives function in much the same way, collectivizing in order to fight for shared
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goals. These cooperatives can have both narrow and wide aims, and are a major source
of PAC contributions.
The second umbrella of interest groups is agribusinesses. Unlike producer
lobbies, these businesses share a close working relationship with the government, and are
not just donating money to political figures in exchange for support. Their revolving
door relationship has been a big focus point for the problems currently facing America,
not only in the agricultural sector but also in other sectors as well. Similarly to the
producer lobbies, agribusinesses are also split into three main groups, general
organizations, commodity organizations and Washington Representatives. These three
share many characteristics in common with their counterparts above, but the breakdown
of groups within the three larger sectors is slightly different.
The first group is the general organization, which encompasses groups such as the
Chamber of Commerce, Frozen Foods and Grocery stores. In this area the groups can be
thought of as certain key areas of food sales.50 Moving to the second group, the
commodity organization, the focus is similarly as narrow as the commodity producer
lobby above. These commodity groups focus on specific products as well, including the
cotton, meat, milk, and grain commodities. The final sector within the agribusiness area
is the Washington Representative. These representatives represent specific firms, and
directly lobby Congressmen and donate to their campaigns.51
There is what is known as a revolving door relationship between business and
government, and there are both positive and negative externalities stemming from this
reciprocating relationship. Many now argue that the problems currently facing America,
50
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not only in the agricultural sector but also in other sectors as well, stems from this
unchecked relationship. The positives of this are that the candidates are very
knowledgeable in the area, allowing them to perform their jobs extremely well.
However, there are some skeptics that short change this theory and argue that there is no
incentive to perform their jobs well if it would potentially harm future job opportunities.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the four major areas of economic theory that affect the agricultural
market--vertical integration, economies of scale, elasticity of markets and subsidization-affect the agricultural sector in a myriad of ways, some positive and some negative.
Through the processes of integration and expansion of scale and combined with the
elasticity and variability within the market, government subsidization policies in the form
of price controls and income supports has been the answer.
From the post WWII period onward, the legislation has evolved from the New
Deal, heavy government intervention policies in the 1930s to the Farm Bills in the 60s
and 70s to the much more market oriented policies in the FAIR Act and ARPA in the 90s
and 2000s. The methods in which the government has supported the farmer has changed
from more government and farmer centric policies to more hands off, market oriented
policies. Alongside this shift, the involvement and composition of the interest groups has
also changed, growing considerably larger and consolidating power.
The landscape today has shown there to be a tight relationship between
government and business, leading to precarious positions for those in government who do
not wish to jeopardize their futures in the private sector. These economic and political

35

factors have all led up to the landscape of the agricultural sector today, and understanding
the relationship is the key to moving forward in a progressive and positive way.
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Chapter 3
Data Set and Regression Analyses
Introduction
This chapter will contain multiple regressions analyses designed to determine the
real correlation between subsidization and price and production. The main question is
what will happen to the agricultural sector if price supports and all other subsidies stop?
Using the regressions in order to determine the independent variable coefficients, this
chapter will conclude with an equation I developed which can then be used to calculate
the effects. My hypothesis is that production would be lower than it is today and the
level of disparity between farm and non-farm incomes would be much higher. Also, the
price and market structure would be much different; prices would be higher and there
would be even higher a level of monopolization within the agricultural sector.
The structure of this fourth chapter will be first an exposition on the data set,
namely where the data was obtained, the nature and definitions of the variables and their
importance to the model. Second will be the bulk of the chapter containing the multiple
regression analyses for the chosen crops, corn, cotton and soybeans. I will also detail the
methodology of my research as well discuss why I have chosen the crops I did. The third
and final section will be the empirical model containing the variable coefficients as well
as the formula used to ascertain the effects of subsidies and more importantly what would
happen should they cease to continue.
The model as it is so far will have 4 separate regressions for each of the 3 crops
(corn, wool, soybeans), one with price as the dependent variable and the others with
production levels, subsidy amounts and gross revenue (price x production) as the other
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dependent variables. The independent variables included in the analyses are subsidy
levels, import levels, export levels, net farm income, and either price/production
depending on the regression. There are also several nuances in the structure of the
variables as well as their relationships to one another that I will expound on when
beginning the analysis.
Data Set and Descriptive Statistics
Within this paper, my economic analysis will focus on three distinct crops, corn,
cotton and soybeans. There are several specific reasons as to why these were the crops
chosen, none more important than their overall importance in the agricultural sector of
the economy. Corn and cotton are the biggest food and non-food crops respectively.
Their importance both historically as well as presently make them ideal candidates for an
empirical analysis, and the data for both is very well catalogued and researched. The
soybean was the third crop chosen because much more recently it has become somewhat
of a competitor to corn. With the expanding biofuel market, both corn and soybean
products can be used as fuel, and as direct competitors in that respect makes for an
interesting comparison.
The data for the regression analyses comes from USDA agricultural crop
databases for all three crops. The subsidy figures come from the Environmental Working
Group subsidy database. The data will be in a time series format, spanning the 1995 to
the 2012/2013 periods. For soybeans, the data begins in 2000 and concludes in 2011, due
to its more recent nature and with the 2012 and onward figures still under evaluation. As
stated above, the variables included for all three crops include price, production, import,
export, and subsidy amounts, as well as a gross price*production figure. Additionally,
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the inclusion of the American Net Farm Income variable helps identify other mediating
factors which trend along with price and production. In analyzing the price and
production variables together, I have decided to include a 1-year lag for price and
production figures, as production one year might correspond to a shift in prices in the
following year rather than the same year.
The tables below outline the data for all three crops
Table 1. Corn Data
Year
Production Exports
(Million
(Million
Bushels)
Bushels)

Imports
(Million
Bushels)

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

16.487
13.261
8.81
18.806
14.744
6.824
10.14
14.446
14.076
10.83
8.806
11.983
20.021
13.53
8.343
27.669
29.368
162.394

7400.051
9232.557
9206.832
9758.685
9430.612
9915.051
9502.58
8966.787
10087.292
11805.581
11112.187
10531.123
13037.875
12091.648
13091.862
12446.865
12359.612
10780.296

56.589
45.655
38.214
50.401
49.191
49.313
48.383
40.334
48.258
46.181
54.201
53.987
61.913
46.965
50.295
46.59
39.184
17.781

Table 2. Cotton Data
Year
Production Exports Imports
(Million
(Million (Million
Bushels)
Bushels) Bushels)
1995
1996
1997

17900
18942
18793

7675
6865
7500

408
403
13

Subsidy
WeightedAmount
average farm
(million
price (dollars
dollars)
per bushel)
2934.905
2.26
2119.059
3.24
2906.3
2.71
5064.623
2.43
7567.377
1.94
8058.49
1.82
5982.553
1.85
2498.438
1.97
3439.944
2.32
5308.631
2.42
10138.944
2.06
5796.967
2
3805.91
3.04
4194.188
4.2
3778.97
4.06
3495.34
3.55
4663.99
5.18
2702.462
6.22

Subsidy
Amount
(million
dollars)
211.64
807.49
744.71

Weightedaverage farm
price (dollars
per bushel)
72
76.5
70.5

NFI (Real
2009
Dollars)

Price x
Production

72250417
79362708
78033315
73141540
72353587
70051721
74080388
59778179
83159504
93871157
94199225
72183779
79505716
88755793
73874299
96543061
122829596
127947766

16724.11526
29913.48468
24950.51472
23713.60455
18295.38728
18045.39282
17579.773
17664.57039
23402.51744
28569.50602
22891.10522
21062.246
39635.14
50784.9216
53152.95972
44186.37075
64022.79016
67053.44112

NFI (Real
2009
Dollars)

Price x
Production

72250417
79362708
78033315

1288800
1449063
1324906.5
39

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

13918
16968
17188
20303
17209
18255
23251
23890
21588
19207
12815
12188
18104
15573
17315
13105

4298
6750
6740
11000
11900
13758
14436
17673
12959
13634
13261
12037
14376
11714
13026
10400

439
97
16
21
67
45
29
28
19
12
0
0
9
19
10
10

Table 3. Soybean Data
Year
Production Exports Imports
(Million
(Million (Million
Bushels)
Bushels) Bushels)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

2758
2891
2756
2454
3124
3068
3197
2677
2967
3359
3329
3056

995.871
1063.65
1044.37
886.551
1097.15
939.878
1116.49
1158.82
1279.29
1499.04
1501.30
1275

3.568
2.32
4.661
5.562
5.576
3.372
9.034
9.871
1.3263
1.4598
1.4449
1.6136

1317.97
1944.9
2067.6
3332.6
1950.393
2550.96
2229.214
3696.295
2979.752
2541.484
1582.403
2213.782
828.339
1311.672
560.924

66.2
61.7
46.8
51.6
32
45.7
63
44.7
49.7
48.4
61.3
49.1
62.8
84.2
91.4
74.8

73141540
72353587
70051721
74080388
59778179
83159504
93871157
94199225
72183779
79505716
88755793
73874299
96543061
122829596
127947766
122110381

921371.6
1046925.6
804398.4
1047634.8
550688
834253.5
1464813
1067883
1072923.6
929618.8
785559.5
598430.8
1136931.2
1311246.6
1582591
980254

Subsidy
Amount
(million
dollars)
3234.051
4602.195
954.541
1493.547
1449.036
1079.888
1228.029
1183.622
2048.182
1672.746
1554.841
2082.443

Weightedaverage farm
price (dollars
per bushel)
4.63
4.54
4.38
5.53
7.34
5.74
5.66
6.43
10.1
9.97
9.59
11.3

NFI (Real
2009
Dollars)

Price x
Production

70051721
74080388
59778179
83159504
93871157
94199225
72183779
79505716
88755793
73874299
96543061
122829596

12769.54
13125.14
12071.28
13570.62
22930.16
17610.32
18095.02
17213.11
29966.7
33489.23
31925.11
34532.8

Regression analysis
Each table below, 4 each for corn, cotton and soybeans, will contain individual
explanations of the results. After all 12 regression analyses, a cross-sectional analysis
will be done, basically an analysis comparing one to each other to determine the true
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relationship between subsidization and price and production. I have chosen to do
multiple regressions for each crop in order to mete out correlation bias, namely a question
as to which variable might cause the other. This is especially pertinent concerning the
relationship between subsidization and price. One the one hand, subsidization may and
most likely does cause changes in prices. However, in a world with price prediction,
economic forecasts of future prices may also impact the political negotiations that
allocate subsidy money. So which of the two is to be believed, or are both at play? In
order to determine these parallel scenarios, I have analyzed the data together, and have
made graphs charting the relationship between the two. In these cases, there is no clear
relationship for corn, a somewhat positive relationship for soybeans, and an oppositional
(negative) relationship for cotton. I have also run regressions with both price and
subsidy amount as independent variables, which should, when analyzed together, come to
form a complete picture.

Corn Subsidy and Price Correlation
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Soybean Subsidy and Price Correlation
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Cotton Subsidy and Price Correlation
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The regression analysis done in this chapter uses the Gretl statistical software and
runs regressions using ordinary least squares estimations. There are several key figures
to note within the regression tables, and they are the variable coefficients, the p-values,
the R-squared statistic as well as the adjusted R-squared statistic. First are the variables
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and their coefficients. There are 7 total variables for each of the three crops, with 4
different regressions run. Several of the variables are self explanatory, with production,
export, import and subsidy variables denoting the amount in each category. Weightedaverage farm price can be better thought of as average price of the crop throughout each
year. The price of each crop should be noted as nominal in price, not indexed to inflation
or set to a base year. The final two variables are net farm income (NFI) and gross
revenue. Gross revenue is simply price*production, which yields the total amount of
money generated for each crop. NFI is the total farmer income for all farmers for each
year. Unlike price, net farm income (NFI) is set to real 2009 dollars, indicating its real
vs. nominal nature and its 2009 base year.
Moving to the variable coefficients column, the values tell us that for a 1%
increase in the independent variable, the total increase or decrease of the dependent
variable would change by that coefficient value on average, holding the other variables
constant. It must be said however that this only holds for variables with statistical
significance, as those without significance cannot be said to have that relationship. For
the p-values specifically, it is important to note that asterisk denotations indicate
statistical significance for the .1, .05 and .01 levels.

43

Table 4. Corn Gross Crop Value as Dependent Variable

The first regression uses the gross price*production figure as the dependent
variable, with exports, imports, subsidy amount and NFI as the independent variables.
Interestingly, there was only one statistically significant variable, NFI. Its coefficient of
7.5*10-5 seems small, but it is important to note that the scale of these variables is in the
millions, so a small change in the independent variable can still yield larger results when
put into context. In this case, the coefficient indicates that a 1 unit increase in NFI would
lead to an increase of 7.5*10-5 for the gross price*production figure. Another notable
figure to look at is the R-squared statistic. The R-squared statistic measures the amount
of variation that can be accounted for within this analysis. In this case, at .39, only 39%
of the variation within the gross price*production figure can be said to come from these
independent variables. Looking critically, this means that there are potentially other
variables not included that might hold more of a correlation than the ones listed here. On
the other hand, it is not uncommon for R-squared percentages to be around this 30-50%
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range, as there are certain outliers and inconsistencies that can sometimes diminish the
explained variation.
Table 5. Corn Price as Dependent variable

The next regression uses the corn price as the dependent variable, with exports,
imports, subsidy amount, NFI and production amount as the independent variables.
Unlike the first regression, there are 3 statistically significant results in this run. For all
three-subsidy amount, NFI and production there is a statistically significant correlation
with price. It is important to note however, that this correlation does not necessarily
imply causality. In this case, there might even be reciprocal relationships between the
independent and dependent variables that hinder any real analyses.
The coefficients for these three variables indicate a negative relationship between
subsidization and price, which is to be expected. As subsidization goes up, the price will
go down as the increased subsidization will lead to higher production, which in turn
increases supply, thereby decreasing price. For the other two variables, the correlation is
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positive; meaning as they go up price goes up as well. However, I do believe there to be
some reciprocity in these relationships, meaning that it may be the case that price is
impacting NFI and Production, not the other way around. In this way price increases
would lead to more production and a higher NFI as the higher price would entice more
production to occur. In any case, one must be careful to not take the data at face value
alone, but must think critically in order to ascertain the real meaning behind it. Notably,
the R-squared statistic in this case is very high, at .869, meaning that almost 87% of the
variation in price can be accounted for by these independent variables. Looking
critically, this means that this set of variables do well to explain the changes in price on a
year-to-year basis.
Table 6. Corn Production as Dependent Variable

The third regression takes production amount of corn as the dependent variable.
Unlike with price, production does not see as much in the way of statistically significant
relationships. The only significance comes from the price independent variable, but I
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believe that to be from price’s heavy impact on future production. As indicated with the
data tables above, there is a one year lag in order to see price’s effect on production the
year after, and it is unsurprising that it is significant, and so high as well. In this
regression a 1-dollar increase in crop price per bushel leads to 1303.64 increases in
production, which is in millions of bushels. In this way one can see the tremendous
impact even a small change in price can do. Going from say 4 to 5 dollars a bushel leads
to over a billion more bushels being produced in order to try and get some of the profits.
Table 7. Corn Subsidy Amount as Dependent Variable

The final corn regression takes subsidy amount as the dependent variable. As
Table 7 shows, both NFI and crop price are statistically significant, with price having a
negative relationship and NFI a positive one. Intuition would say that this is to be
expected, as when price goes down subsidization goes up due to the price support
policies in place by the government. On the other hand it must be noted that this could
also be a reciprocal relationship in that increased subsidization makes the price go down,
similar to Table 5’s regression with price as the dependent variable.
47

Looking at all four of the corn regressions together, the picture painted is one of
very close relationships between price, production and subsidization. Price as an
independent variable was significant in all instances, and NFI was also a great predictor.
While exports and imports were never significant, it is interesting to think about why. As
a crop, corn is the biggest food crop in the US, used in a variety of different industries.
Intrinsically, import figures are going to be very low as such a major crop would not need
to be imported. As well the relationship between import amounts and the other variables
would not be that important.
Moving to cotton, I hypothesized that these regressions would behave in a similar
manner to corn. Being the biggest non-food crop, the close ties between price,
production and subsidization should be present. Additionally, as cotton is a majorly
exported crop, with the US exporting almost 50% of the world’s cotton, I also expect
export numbers to also play a statistically significant role in the regression analyses.
Table 8. Cotton Gross Crop value as Dependent Variable
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The first regression again used the gross price*production figure as the dependent
variable, with exports, imports, subsidy amount and NFI as the independent variables.
Interestingly and similarly to corn, there was only one statistically significant variable, in
this case the constant. Unlike corn, NFI was not significant. The R-squared statistic in
this case is notable as at .27, only 27% of the variation within the gross price*production
figure can be said to come from these independent variables. Looking critically, this
means that there is probably other variables not included that might hold more of a
correlation than the ones listed here. Moving forward, it will be important to see whether
this remains the case or if the issue just lies with this regression’s structure and not with
the variables.
Table 9. Cotton Price as Dependent Variable

Moving to the price regression for cotton, there are three significant independent
variables. NFI and subsidy amount remain positive and negatively respectively similar to
the corn price regression, which makes sense given the nature of the subsidization policy
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within the US. What is unique about this regression is the negative relationship between
price and export amount. In this case as export amounts increase, price goes down.
Notably, the R-squared statistic in this case is very high, at .91, meaning that 91% of the
variation in cotton’s price can be accounted for by these independent variables. This
means that this set of variables do well to explain the changes in price on a year-to-year
basis.
Table 10. Cotton Production as Dependent Variable

The third cotton regression shows no significant relationships between the
independent and dependent variables. This is similar in a way to corn, but even so price
was not significant as it was for corn. The closest variable to being statistically relevant
was subsidy amount, with a p-value of .11, higher than the .10 thresholds. Again, the Rsquared was not reasonably low, but at only .36 there can be other variables that predict
the variation in production amounts.
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Table 11. Cotton Subsidy Amount as Dependent Variable

The final cotton regression takes subsidy amount as the dependent variable. In
this case only the constant and cotton price were significant, with price having a negative
relationship. As stated above with corn, intuition would say that this is to be expected, as
when price goes down subsidization goes up due to the price support policies in place by
the government. On the other hand it must be noted that this could also be a reciprocal
relationship in that increased subsidization makes the price go down.
Table 12. Soybeans Gross Crop Value as Dependent Variable
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Table 13. Soybeans Price as Dependent Variable

Tables 12 and 13 show some promising statistical significances, mostly
concerning exports. For both regressions export amount was relevant, highlighting the
major role exports have in both cotton production and price. Strengthening this
argument, the R-squared statistic for the price regression was .92 meaning that almost all
of the variation in price can be accounted for. Given that only exports and NFI were
statistically significant, it is easy to conclude that they play a major role in determining
price levels. In the price regression NFI was also significant, but I hesitate to conclude
that it is really NFI that raises price or if it is the other way around. As prices increase it
is only logical that farm income would increase as well, as farmers would receive higher
compensation for their crops. In this way it can be said for all three crops to be the case
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Table 14. Soybeans Production as Dependent Variable

Table 15. Soybeans Subsidy Amount as Dependent Variable

The last two regressions concerning production and subsidy amount as dependent
variables both found no statistically significant results. This was interesting, and I can
venture several reasons as to why this is the case. While corn and cotton go as far back
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as 1995 in the data, yielding 17 observations, soybeans only contain data from 20002011. In this way it is even more surprising to find statistical relevance at all given the
small number of observations. Additionally, soybeans are relatively new to the stage
compared to corn, signifying that there may be less subsidization in that area, leading to a
much looser relationship between subsidization and price and production.
Looking across all three crops, there are several similarities that lead to some
general conclusions. For both corn and cotton price and production were very closely
related, as was NFI for all three crops. This indicates that the agricultural sector as a
larger entity is not as starkly diversified in its relationships as one might think, and even
across food and non-food crops the relationship between subsidization and output can be
seen.
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Chapter 4
Pros and Cons of Price Supports
Introduction
This chapter will outline the pros and cons of price and income supports. The
main point of this chapter will be to show that there are both positive and negative
attributes with these two means of subsidy support. I have outlined below 4 distinct pros
and cons of price and income support subsidies.
Pros
1. Creates price stability
2. Helps support farmer’s incomes
3. Increases political involvement
4. Elastic vs. Inelastic nature of the market spurs an economic power struggle
Cons
1. Price supports lead to higher commodity prices, which is bad for consumers.
2. Price support programs cost money.
3. The government may not accurately support the different crops.
4. Overproduction can lead to expansion in capacity when there might not need to be
expansion.
In the narrative of agricultural subsidization, the two major political factions come
down as either in favor of a more highly involved government or in favor of a much freer
market. By looking at both the positives and negatives of the current policies in place,
the cost benefit analysis can be determined and the overall discussion of where to go
from here can be discussed. Overall, I believe that while there are certainly some
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drawbacks, they can be mediated and moving forward there can be a comprehensive
policy platform that can both achieve the economic goals of the government while at the
same time not impinging on the free market or personal/ collective rights.
Pros and Cons of Price and Income Supports
Price Stability vs. Higher Prices
The first positive achievement of the current free market oriented price and
income supports is the stabilization of crop markets. As the agricultural market expanded
throughout the 20th century through increased in demand and production capacity, the
larger market also increased in unpredictability.52 Food markets in particular fall victim
to certain trends of unpredictability and much higher booms and busts. As Gardner wrote
in his book American Agriculture, food is much more cyclically sensitive, meaning that
supply and demand are much more responsive to market forces.53 This leads to much
bigger market booms and busts. While promoters of the free market might hail the large
upswings, the downturns have devastating effects. As was seen in times of economic
hardship such as the Great Depression, low demand can lead to rotting crops and farmers
being unable to sell their product. This in turn puts farmers out of business.
In response to this unpredictability, the government had an incentive to stabilize
prices, both by setting a price floor and indexing prices to a set base level. This goal of
supporting prices and farm incomes began in the 1930s with several new deal policies,
and became explicitly more important in the 1970s.54 Over that 40-year 1930-1970
period, the policies implemented were impactful, but not necessarily economically
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efficient. Certain production control programs that were designed to bolster falling
prices, such as acreage retirements and government purchasing of grain were seen as
unnecessarily inefficient, and the transition moved toward more market oriented policies
in the 1990s, as I discussed in the previous chapter.55
While the bolstering of prices is definitely a positive boost for farmer’s
production and incomes, the drawback comes in the form of higher food prices, which is
bad for consumers. The impact of these market-oriented policies designed to set base
levels for crops is that in certain instances the price is higher than the market equilibrium
price. The flaw in this case is that when prices are set to parity levels, it is often the
wrong level. As Knutson, Penn and Boehm write in Agriculture and Food Policy, the
parity price level is set to equal purchasing power of 1910-1914.56 This means that the
cost per unit of the crop will be able to buy the same amount of goods it was able to buy
in 1910-1914. While this may sound good on the surface, there are more hidden effects.
By setting prices to a level so far in the past, the economic and productive gains since
then are not reflected in the price. This means that while it now costs less per unit to
produce a certain crop thanks to increasingly effective fertilizer and genetic
modifications, the costs to consumers do not necessarily go down accordingly. The
producers realize the entirety of the savings, while the consumer sees none.
Painting the picture of the stark contrast between price stability vs. higher prices
for consumers is somewhat disingenuous. While it is enticing to say that the consumers
have not realized any cost savings, it is not the case when looking at the data. There are
several key economic figures that paint a much more positive picture for consumers,
55
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indicating that there is not just a reaping of profits by producers alone, but that consumers
also have benefited over time. Firstly, the percentage of disposable income spent on food
has gone way down from 41% to 12% over time.57 And secondly, food prices have
actually gone down overall (35%) throughout the past several decades. Now, is it
plausible to say that these downtrends have been due to the policy decisions put in place
by the government or is it in spite of them? Overall, I believe that the benefits in this
case do outweigh the risks. The increased stability has certainly positively benefitted
both the industry and the market as a whole, and even though setting prices to a level so
far in the past might diminish cost savings towards consumers, there have still been
realized effects in the form of lower prices and lower amounts of income spent on food.
Income Support vs. Costs
In addition to price stability policies, income support to farmers has been the
second major policy goal of the US government. Throughout history farm incomes have
been lower than non-farm incomes, and in response the government has sought to
redistribute income in a sense towards these low-income farmers.58 Falling prices also
have a tremendous impact on farmer income, which in a very real way ties together both
price supports and income payments. With the Great Depression came a plummeting
prices, down 55% between 1929-1933.59 The New Deal in this respect painted farmers as
a very weak group, with little to no bargaining power.60 From then onward, the
government has aggressively supported farmers growing major crops, as well as

57

Gardner American Agriculture page 141
Pasour Jr. and Rucker Plowshares and Porkbarrels page 20-21
59
Ibid page 86-87
60
Ibid page 73
58

58

increased and stabilized earnings over time through the passage of Farm Bills throughout
the 1950s-1990s.61
While this depiction of farmers as a weak group both economically and politically
has been true historically, there is much more doubt today as to whether or not it is still
true. Knutson, Penn and Boehm highlight this in their work by noting the major
arguments against this government involvement in favor of a much freer market. The
argument presented is that both price and income supports are no longer necessary, as
farmers’ incomes are fine now.62 Additionally, with the increasing average size of farms,
along with the increase in automation, the necessity of the same amount of support has
been challenged.63 Thirdly, many of the concerns that farmers are not represented
politically have gone away with the introduction of lobbyists and interest groups in
Washington.
This is one area of current policy where I struggle to see current merit in the
structure of income supports. I accept more the premise that farmers are in less need of
generous income supports, given the successful nature of price supports along with other
factors. With the rise of industrial farms, coupled with the heavy automation today, there
is less and less labor required to farm a given area. This leads me to believe more that
smaller farms and farmers are being pushed out of the marker and that big business is
reaping the subsidies, which in my mind is unnecessary. There is certain room to adapt
this policy to help the small farmer, which I do agree is a noble cause, but to increasingly
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increase income supports through direct payments to parties that are generating massive
profits is unnecessary and not a wise decision.
Beginning all the way back with the New Deal programs, government
involvement and by extension government expenditures have increased dramatically.
From 1929-1935 alone the USDA expenditures went up from $200 million dollars to $1.2
billion dollars.64 This continued well into the 1970s and 80s, with additional programs
such as acreage allotments and grain conservation costing even more through lost
revenue and opportunity costs. The table below shows overall subsidy amounts from the
1995 through 2011 period, with each year growing more and more.65 Just over the last 15
years the total amount spent on crop subsidies was $277,672,554,138 dollars, over a
quarter trillion dollars.
Year

Overall Subsidy Amount

Subsidy Amount as a
percentage of GDP
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1995

8,131,563,163

0.07%

1996

8,255,869,060

0.07%

1997

8,357,895,525

0.07%

1998

13,303,944,390

0.11%

1999

22,964,171,712

0.18%

2000

24,740,234,687

0.19%

2001

24,247,372,508

0.19%

2002

14,068,373,158

0.10%
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2003

18,116,222,690

0.13%

2004

15,341,958,208

0.10%

2005

24,309,014,460

0.16%

2006

17,035,215,324

0.11%

2007

14,430,758,109

0.09%

2008

17,032,492,997

0.11%

2009

16,321,523,606

0.11%

2010

15,364,353,500

0.10%

2011

15,651,591,041

0.10%

When discussing subsidization of agriculture, the staggering amount of money
spent to ensure stable prices and high farmer income does come at a cost. In this case it
is exactly that, the costs of the programs. Billions of dollars spent per year have to come
from somewhere, and that normally winds up coming from the taxpayers. In this
structure, it is not always going to be feasible or wise to spend this money on subsidies
over other programs, and in times of economic hardship when the American people need
the money the most it becomes a moral argument as to why they should pay out. In
recent years there have been attempts to rein in skyrocketing costs, but not in a fashion
that would cut subsidizations in any meaningful ways. Looking to the future, the cost
benefit analysis must be done in order to see whether it is sound policy to continue such
costly programs.
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Political Activism vs. Moneyed Interests
Political activism from farmers and farm groups has been a great benefit with
respect to political activism. Interest groups lobby Congress for bills that will directly
impact them and shape the economic argument in their favor, and representation in
Washington is something all major groups in Washington should strive for. However,
when businesses comingle with the government in ways that cross the boundaries
between the just and unjust, moneyed interests can and do cause negative externalities.
The two main branches of interest groups, the producer lobbies and agribusinesses
have amassed a large amount of political clout and the landscape today highlights the
winners. The strength of the producer lobby lies in the amount of farmers represented and
their relative importance in the state they are in. Consequently, as their numbers decline
their power and influence also declines. This begs the question of why aid has gone up
even though the number of farmers has gone down. One of the two main farmers unions,
The National Farmers Union is a staunch supporter of price and income supports as well
as major governmental involvement in price setting and crop insurance.66 This is a
particularly strong reason as to why aid has continued. Through donations and the
political games of Washington, the NFU can sway the outcomes on bills that will directly
influence its members.
Moving to a second politically active group, commodity groups who focus on a
specific product or crop, including input producers, machinery makers and transportation
companies, their relative strength rises and falls with their relative importance in the
American agricultural sector and the relative strength of the sector as a whole. Increasing
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and continued subsidization in this case will only strengthen their sales and increase their
productive capacities, which spells out why many commodity groups, like farmers
unions, are in favor of continuing the current policies in place.
Looking at the current political landscape from a more cynical perspective, there
seems to be what is known as a revolving door relationship between business and
government, which holds both positive and negative consequences. Many now argue that
the problems currently facing America, not only in the agricultural sector but also in
other sectors as well, stems from this unchecked relationship. Below is a picture
depicting the relationship between the Federal Government and the Monsanto
Corporation, a leader in genetically modified seeds and pesticides. As it shows, lobbyists
on Monsanto’s side move to representatives and consultants for the Federal Government,
and Congressmen and staff members move into consultant positions within Monsanto.
The positives of this relationship are that the candidates are very knowledgeable
in the area, allowing them to perform their jobs extremely well. However, there are some
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skeptics that short change this theory and argue that there is no incentive to perform their
jobs well if it would potentially harm future job opportunities. For example, why would
someone working for the FDA push for stricter regulation if it would harm Monsanto,
when they plan on potentially working for Monsanto in the future? The landscape today
has shown there to be a tight relationship between government and business, leading to
precarious positions for those in government who do not wish to jeopardize their futures
in the private sector. These economic and political factors have are ever important in
today’s uncompromising political climate and understanding the relationship is the key to
moving forward in a progressive and positive way.
Government Estimation and the Problem of Overproduction
While most of the issues discussed above have both positive and negative
attributes, two specific cons of price supports are the problems of accurate support and
over/underproduction. First, when the government institutes policies such as price and
income supports, there are measurable effects on the specific crops the policies are
purported to protect and promote. In this way, if the government inaccurately supports
the crops by either setting prices too high or too low, the economy is negatively affected.
This brings about case number two, overproduction. In the case of the government
overshooting the market price, overproduction occurs, which brings along with it its own
set of externalities.
Knutson, Penn and Boehm highlight the first of the two problems in their book
Agriculture and Food Policy. They identify what they call the “price support dilemma”,
which states that price supports lead to increased production, which in turn leads to
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perverse incentives that further perpetuates government involvement.67 In this way, price
supports contain an inherent flaw in that if they are not matched exactly what would be
the true equilibrium price there will be over/underestimations of demand, leading to
overproduction or shortages.
Elastic vs. Inelastic Markets and the Struggle for Economic Power
The elasticity of demand for crops within the agricultural market plays an
important role in the determination of whether or not the government should grant
subsidies and directly intervene in the market. As was stated in chapter 2, in economics,
elasticity indicates how much of one good will be sold when another variable is changed.
This can be on the supply side or demand side. For the supply side the question would be
how much more will I produce and the demand side would be how much more will be
demanded. Within these parameters, price elasticity of demand is almost always
negative, meaning as the price of the good goes up; the demand for it will go down.
Within the agricultural sector, this negative price elasticity can be seen. The
elasticity of demand for crops according to Gardner in American Agriculture in the 20th
Century is -.2, meaning that for every unit of price increase the demand for the good will
go down by .2 units.68 Within the market itself, the price of these crops is also very
sensitive. In this sense, the power in the dynamic is not in the hands of the consumers, as
they are at the mercy of volatile price swings. These price swings, coupled with the
inelastic nature of the market leads to demand inconsistencies, as well as the potential for
consumers to wind up in positions where food prices could be so high as to not be
affordable or too low, in which case there would be food shortages.
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The picture painted by these three economic effects is not economically or
politically ideal. The market is unpredictable, big corporate farms are pushing out the
small farmers, consumers are being forced to buy at artificially higher prices and there is
no private sector insurance for farmers in case of crop disaster. These negative
externalities beg for resolution, and the answers dating all the way back to the New Deal
era and used still today is subsidies. This is arguable the biggest positive factor for both
price stabilization and income support. The price stabilization methods put in place shift
the power back to the consumer, who now does not have to worry about these massive
swings. The markets have stabilized, which in turn stabilize demand. So in this case not
only do the consumers benefit, but also companies. Their profit horizons are more easily
predictable, spurring innovation, investment and expansion.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the narrative so far has been one of a rabid, unstable agricultural
market, replete with negative externalities as well as disadvantaged consumers and
farmers alike. These negative externalities have been dealt with for the past 80 years
through price and income supports stemming from government intervention. Earlier in
history, the benefits of these policy decisions were seen to far outweigh the risks.
However, recently politics has split into two major factions, one side in favor of a more
highly involved government and the other the opposite, in favor of a much freer market.
Overall, the arguments presented regarding the current state of affairs do not mean that
these price and income programs should be scrapped entirely; I think that that would be a
huge detriment to the agricultural sector as well as the larger economy. However, I
believe that while there are certainly some drawbacks, they can be mediated.
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By adapting and slightly modifying the policies in place, costs can be brought
back under control and rampant political influence can be marginalized in favor of a
system that benefits both sides evenly as opposed to solely moneyed interests. Moving
forward there can be a comprehensive policy platform that can both achieve the
economic goals of the government while at the same time not subjecting consumers,
small farmers and others to the growing agribusiness sector.
In the next chapter in this thesis, I will closely analyze the current state of affairs
in both a political and economic light. This section will include the formulaic data
obtained regarding production and exports, and as was said in chapter three project out
into the future where we are headed now and where we could be headed without
subsidies. Coupled with this, the most recent farm bills passed in 2008 and 2013 will be
deconstructed to see what, if anything, has changed. Finally, I will move towards the
concluding chapter in this thesis, namely what is next for American agriculture? I will
prescribe both policy recommendations as well as give my thoughts on a broader take on
agriculture and its place in American life and whether or not the system of conglomerate
farming is necessarily the best policy moving into a more globalized, mechanized future.
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Chapter 5
Where we are today, and where we’re going
Introduction
After the previous chapter highlighted the relationships between price and
production with other independent variables, it is key not only to look at the history of the
factors, but to also project out to see what to expect in the coming years. In this way I
will use the regression coefficients to structure a formula used to ascertain the effects of
subsidies and more importantly what would happen should they cease to continue. For
each of the three crops there will be both a speculation using current subsidy figures that
will continue to grow at the rate they have been during the past decade as well as a
speculation where subsidy amounts will be zero. The second part of the chapter will look
into the most recent farm bill from 2008 as well as the two farm bills that failed to pass in
2013. This will also help give insight to the future of the agricultural sector and how
Congress and different interest groups are moving forward.
Growth Rates
Using the same data from the regression for all three crops, I graphed the change
in the variable values over time.69 Using an exponential trend line function, I found the
average growth rates for each of the variables, exports, imports, production, subsidy, and
price. Below is a table outlining all of the growth rates for corn, cotton and soybeans.
Table 1 Growth rates
Production Exports
Corn

69

2.50%

-2.10%

Imports

Subsidy

Price

NFI

6.78%

0.36%
-12.7%
since 2005

5.35%

2.66%

Graphs are in the appendix
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Cotton

-1%

4.37%

-32.40%

3.28%
0.58%
-24% since
2005
Soybeans
1.51%
-0.89%
-0.34%
8.71%
3.68
Two important figures are the subsidy growth rates in both corn and cotton. While the
overall average growth rates are both positive, they have both gone down substantially
since 2005, indicating a shift in policy around that time that curtailed subsidy support.
Another interesting figure is Net Farm Income, which has grown 2.66% over the 19952013 period. This shows that farmers have been doing better, with incomes rising.
Using these growth rates, it is easy to roughly extrapolate out into the near future,
keeping in mind that the speculative values would only hold given no major shifts in
policy. Table 2 below shows the speculative values for all three crops.
Table 2. Speculations

Corn

Cotton

Year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023

Production
(Million
Bushels)
14273.275
14630.107
14995.860
15370.756
15755.025
16148.901
16552.623
16966.439
17390.600
17825.365

Exports
(Million
Bushels)
31.08
30.43
29.79
29.17
28.55
27.95
27.37
26.79
26.23
25.68

Imports
(Million
Bushels)
37.373
39.90688
42.61257
45.50170
48.58672
51.88090
55.39843
59.15444
63.16511
67.44771

Subsidy
Amount
(million
dollars)
2799.75063
2900.54165
3004.96115
3113.13975
3225.21278
3341.32044
3461.60798
3586.22587
3715.33000
3849.08188

Weightedaverage farm
price (dollars
per bushel)
7.258615
7.646950903
8.056062776
8.487062134
8.941119958
9.419469876
9.923411515
10.45431403
11.01361983
11.60284849

2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021

12973.950
12844.210
12715.768
12588.610
12462.724
12338.097
12214.716
12092.569

10854.48
11328.82
11823.89
12340.59
12879.88
13442.73
14030.18
14643.29

6.76
4.56976
3.089157
2.088270
1.411670
0.954289
0.645099
0.436087

579.322307
598.324078
617.949108
638.217839
659.151384
659.085469
659.019560
658.953658

75.23384
75.67019627
76.10908341
76.55051609
76.99450909
77.44107724
77.89023549
78.34199885

NFI (Real
2009
Dollars)
125358517.1
128693053.7
132116288.9
135630582.2
139238355.7
142942096
146744355.7
150647755.6
154654985.9
158768808.5
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2022
2023

Soy

2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

11971.643
11851.927

15283.21
15951.08

0.294795
0.199281

658.887763
658.821874

78.79638245
79.25340147

3102.146
1321.92
1.613438 2082.2347
12.28423
3148.988
1370.57
1.613277 2082.0265
13.35418643
3196.538
1421.00
1.613115 2081.81833
14.51733607
3244.805
1473.30
1.612954 2081.6101
15.78179604
3293.802
1527.51
1.612793 2081.4019
17.15639048
3343.538
1583.73
1.612632 2081.1938
18.65071209
3394.026
1642.01
1.612470 2080.9857
20.27518911
3445.276
1702.43
1.612309 2080.7776
22.04115808
3497.299
1765.08
1.612148 2080.5695
23.96094295
While the price and production variables have also been expanded into the short

future, it is still important to use the variable coefficients on the independent variables to
see what figures we get. For the corn price dependent regression, the coefficients were .018, .0077, -.0001, 2.7*10-8, and .0002 for exports, imports, subsidy, NFI and production
respectively. Looking at the year 2023, using these coefficients with their corresponding
variable values the price comes out to 7.86. This is around $4 below the projected value
that used the average growth rate. This can possibly be explained through other variables
not included in the regression. The same types of differences are found in the other
regression estimations.
Moving to the main focus, that being the estimated production and price figures
when subsidy amounts were set to zero, the results are interesting.
Price without

Price following

Production

Production following

subsidy

projected growth

without subsidy

projected growth

Corn

$7.48

11.6

19677.42

17825.37

Cotton

106.6

79.25

15112.1

11851.93

Soybeans 17.23

23.96

3035.16

3497.3
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The results of the cancellation of the subsidization programs are interesting, and
not at all surprising. With one of the main goals of current agricultural policy being price
supports, it is not surprising to see the prices of both corn and soybeans go down.
Interestingly, the price of cotton went up, indicating an opposite trend. I believe this to
be due to the major role of exporting in the cotton industry. With subsidization helping
control input and other prices, a lack of those subsidies would force the price up in
response to the higher production costs.
Moving to production figures, all three crops shows similar, smaller changes. For
corn and cotton, the production figures increased while for soybeans it decreased. I
believe the increase in cotton stems from the higher projected price of the crop, allowing
for a higher production amount yielding much greater profits. Similarly for corn, the
reduction in price coupled with the slight increase in production leads to a very similar
gross revenue, showing that the industry would not collapse from an elimination of
subsidization.
Political Landscape Today
The 2008 farm bill is the second most recent farm bill to become a law. Both the
House of Representative and Senate’s 2013 bills were shot down in the House, and the
most recent bill was passed only 3 short months ago in February of 2014. Below is a
table outlining the expenditures in the several major areas, including commodities (price
and income support programs), conservation (land retirement, etc.) and crop insurance.
Those three areas, which have been the major ones I have focused on as they pertain to
direct subsidization over food aid programs and others alone total 194.1 billion dollars.
Additionally, Nutrition as a sector tops the list with 432.2 billion dollars outlaid into
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things like the Food Stamp and SNAP programs among others. This shows that over the
past decade the flow of government money into the agricultural sector has not slowed
down.
Estimated cost of farm bill mandatory programs-Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline
assumptions 1/

Programs

(A)
Estimated
cost under
March 2008
baseline

(B)
Estimated
cost for
baseline
plus 2008
farm bill
cost

Billion dollars
Commodities

75.8

74.8

Conservation

52.5

57.7

Crop insurance

66.1

61.6

Agricultural trade programs, new horticulture and organic
spending, and supplemental disaster assistance in the 2008 farm
bill

3.2

7.1

432.2

441.8

6.5

-3.0

636.2

640.0

Nutrition
Other spending/offsets
Total

1/ Excludes funding for discretionary programs, which is provided through annual
appropriations.
2/ Outlays over 10 years
Source: CBO projections for outlays.
Source: http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-commodity-policy/programprovisions/cost-of-2008-farm-bill.aspx#.U2rZw-ZdXu8
Moving to the direct payment aspect, below are the rates for corn, cotton and soybeans.
As the USDA notes, “Base acres and payment yields are unchanged from those specified
in the 2002 Farm Act…DP rates are unchanged from the 2002 Farm Act. However, the
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DP rate is reduced by 20 percent for producers electing to enroll in the ACRE
program”.70
Direct payment rates
Direct payment Direct payment rate if
Commodity
Unit
rate
enrolled in ACRE
Corn
Bushel
$0.28
$0.22
Upland cotton
Pound
$0.0667
$0.0534
Soybeans
Bushel
$0.44
$0.35
The second major economic program that has been continued is counter-cyclical
payments. These, remember, are payments made to farmers only when prices fall below
the threshold, as a way to stabilize farm income. As was the case for direct payments, not
much has changed from the 2002 farm bill. Below again is the rates for the three main
crops I have looked at in this thesis, corn, cotton and soybeans.71
Target prices
Commodity
Corn
Upland cotton
Soybeans

Unit
Bushel
Pound
Bushel

CY 2008
$2.63
$0.71
$5.80

CY 2009
$2.63
$0.71
$5.80

CY 2010-12
$2.63
$0.71
$6.00

Agricultural Act of 2014
The 2014 Farm Bill is a major change from the previous legislation, with the
Direct Payment, Countercyclical Payment, and the Average Crop Revenue Election
(ACRE) program all being repealed. Instead, two new programs will take the place of
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these commodity programs, the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agriculture Risk
Coverage (ARC) programs.72
The first program, the PLC program, acts much in the same way as counter
cyclical payments, in that farmers receive payments when the crop price falls below the
set threshold. An important note is that cotton is not a covered commodity in this
program. Below is the reference table for both corn and soybeans.73
2014 Farm Act reference prices
Covered commodities
Reference prices
Corn
$3.70 per bushel
Soybeans

$8.40 per bushel

The second program is the Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) Program, which has
both county-based and individual coverage. This means that for either of the two,
payments are provided to producers for their commodities when crop revenue drops
below 86 percent of either the county benchmark revenue or the farm’s individual
benchmark guarantee. For each commodity the payment amount is as the USDA
calculates first for the country choice “the difference between the per-acre guarantee (as
calculated above) and actual per-acre revenue (but no greater than 10 percent of the
commodity’s benchmark revenue), times 85 percent of base acres of the commodity”.
For individual coverage, “The payment amount is the individual farm payment rate (the
difference between the individual farm guarantee and actual individual farm revenue, but
no greater than 10 percent of the farm’s benchmark revenue) times 65 percent of base
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acres for all covered commodities for the individual farm.”74One interesting facet of this
ARC program is the installation of payment limitations. Payments are limited to
$125,000 for each farmer, with an extension of an additional $125,000 for spouses.75
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
This thesis on agricultural subsidies, their economic and political implications and
what would happen to both price and production levels contained several key insights
into both the political and economic spheres in this industry. Looking first at the
technological and scientific advancements, the economic impacts can be seen in three
major areas: production, costs and price. All three show positive change that has shown
to be a big boon to the consumer, dropping prices dramatically over time. However, on a
related note farm labor has also dropped, which has transformed America into a
manufacturing and service economy. Overall the technological advancements,
biotechnological advancements and expansion of information and marketing have led to
the mechanization and industrialization of the farming industry, effectively increasing
farm size, increasing output, decreasing price and decreasing labor. The externalities
related to these effects helped shape both political and economic policy related to the
agricultural sector.
Moving to what has been a (Gardner, 2002)ffected, namely the economic and
political theory and action behind agricultural policy, the historical and economic
analysis I have undertaken has led to interesting findings. I have focused on four major
areas of economic theory that affect the agricultural market: vertical integration,
economies of scale, elasticity of markets and subsidization. These economic linchpins
often hold true to one main school of thought, for instance that subsidization is often a
poor economic policy to undertake because if a company cannot survive on their own
they should be allowed to fail and be replaced. However, in the real world it has not been

76

as simple. Through the processes of integration and expansion of scale within the
farming business model and combined with the elasticity and variability within the
commodities market, government subsidization policies in the form of price controls and
income supports has been the answer to the two main questions, How can we stabilize the
market and make sure farmers earn enough to support themselves?
Politically, the legislation has evolved from the New Deal to the post WWII Farm
Bills in the 50s, 60s and 70s to the much more market oriented policies in the FAIR Act
and ARPA in the 90s and 2000s. These economic and political factors have all led up to
the landscape of the agricultural sector today, one with a tight relationship between
government and business, leading to precarious positions for those in government who do
not wish to jeopardize their futures in the private sector.
So we come to where we are today and where we are going. In the past 10 years,
there has been some drawdown on the vast amount spent on commodities programs, with
the most recent 2014 Agriculture Act essentially cutting and combining everything into
two main support programs, alongside crop insurance. While this does certainly continue
the downward trend on expenditures, it is still in line with the economic and political
school of thought that there should continue to be subsidization at the federal level for
specific crops. The real question that stems from this is what does this mean for the
consumer, the producer, and the American economy? The chapter on the pros and cons
of these price and income supports does well to illuminate the effects. The narrative
historically has been one of an unstable agricultural market, replete with negative
externalities as well as disadvantaged consumers and farmers alike. These negative
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externalities have been dealt with for the past 80 years through price and income supports
stemming from government intervention.
While the current program outline seems to be balancing both economic and
political goals and at the same time reigning in the massive amount of money going out,
there is still merit to the idea that subsidies, more specifically their end, would not
completely dismantle the agricultural sector as some believe. While there are 10s if not
100s of other variables not accounted for in my model, I believe my model’s merit lies
within its exploratory nature and forward prediction. Looking across all three crops,
there are several correlations between both the dependent and independent variables that
lead to some interesting conclusions. For both corn and cotton price and production were
very closely related, as was NFI for all three crops. This indicates that the agricultural
sector as a larger entity is not as starkly diversified in its relationships as one might think,
and even across food and non-food crops the relationship between subsidization and
output can be seen. While most major economic data already supports such a conclusion,
it is important to quantify the magnitude, as well as establish a base to build a forwardlooking perspective on. My results are predictable in that price and production move in
the predicted direction given a stoppage in support, but are interesting in that the swings
are not at all as dramatic as I thought they were going to be.
Price without

Price following

Production

Production following

subsidy

projected growth

without subsidy

projected growth

Corn

$7.48

11.6

19677.42

17825.37

Cotton

106.6

79.25

15112.1

11851.93

Soybeans 17.23

23.96

3035.16

3497.3
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With one of the main goals of current agricultural policy being price supports, it is
not surprising to see the prices of both corn and soybeans go down. However, while this
decrease might spell the end to some farmers that lie right on the edge of profitability, it
did not plummet to cents on the bushel. Similarly with production, it only increased
around 10% for corn, with cotton increasing more along 30%. While this is nothing to
scoff at given the amount produced, it is not too dramatic an increase to make impossible
a return to the projected gross revenue seen today.
Overall, the arguments presented regarding the current state of affairs do not sway
completely in either the direction of unwavering support or complete repulsion. To scrap
these programs entirely and all at once would be a huge detriment to the agricultural
sector as well as the larger economy. However, to continue to slightly draw down these
supports as has been done might not necessarily be a bad thing from an economic
viewpoint, but it would come at a cost. By adapting or slightly modifying the policies in
place to accommodate a much smaller subsidy program, costs could easily be brought to
much lower levels, but it would most likely come at the cost of many small farmers being
put in a bad if not impossible situation due to the great scale advantages afforded big,
mechanized farms. While this could be argued to be better for the American economy
from an efficiency perspective, if indeed the government continues to believe it has a
duty to ensure these small farmers a living, this will make it nigh impossible to achieve
both ends. And with such a switch, the already rampant political influence could just get
worse. Moving forward there can and must be a comprehensive policy platform that can
maybe not fully achieve the both the economic and political goals, but can reach some
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economic goals while at the same time not subjecting consumers, small farmers and
others to the growing agribusiness sector.
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Appendix 1. Evolution Graphs
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Cotton
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Soybeans
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